MODERATOR: All right. Good afternoon from the State Department’s Brussels Media Hub. I’d like to welcome everyone to today’s virtual press briefing. Today we’re very honored to be joined by James P. Rubin, the special envoy and coordinator of the Global Engagement Center.
And finally, a reminder that today’s briefing is on the record. And with that, let’s get started. Special Envoy Rubin, thank you so much for joining us today, and I’ll turn it over to you for your opening remarks.
MR RUBIN: Well, thank you for that, and thank you to all of you who’ve come to hear this discussion. Obviously, the world’s attention is in Italy, where it should be, on the work that leaders are doing on Ukraine, on all of the important subjects that are being addressed by those leaders. But there is a narrow topic that we think is very important, and that’s why we are doing the unusual thing of having a press event at the same time.
Yesterday the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada did something very important, and it began when Secretary Blinken met with President Sandu of Moldova a couple of weeks ago – I was at that meeting – and they had a discussion about Russian intentions in Moldova, and Secretary Blinken was able to share with her some downgraded information that was of extreme importance about Russia’s intentions with regard to the upcoming election and the fact that Russia had an actual – Russian services had a plan. They intended to foment civil unrest if their preferred candidate didn’t win and sought to overthrow the government. And we – Secretary Blinken said that we intended to make this information public as soon as we could, and we were able to do that yesterday along with our partner – partners, the United Kingdom and Canada.
Moldova is important because we have a brave and tested leader who is trying to pursue what’s right for her country, and we want to see as democracies the people in that country have every right to vote for who they choose to vote for, but not to be manipulated secretly, covertly through intelligence activities or covert action or any other step the Russians might take to try to interfere with the election. And so the purpose of this statement and the comments I’m making today is to make it clear that we know what the Russians are up to, that we’re working closely with the Moldovan Government.
On Wednesday we also sanctioned an individual named Evgenia Gutul, the governor of the Gagauzia region, as an active facilitator of fugitive convicted oligarch Ilan Shor and his Shor Party. So we are working with the Moldovan Government to try to make sure that this election is as free and fair as possible and that Russia’s influence is – unfair influence, covert influence – Russia’s attempt to subvert through disinformation an election is minimized. That doesn’t mean that they won’t have some effect. Inevitably they will. But we are working our darnedest to work with the Moldovan Government to minimize that effect, and we believe that by warning the people of Moldova that Russian actors are plotting to influence the outcome of this election and will intend to incite protests and try to overthrow the government through manipulations that are standard in coup plotters around the world, to try to manipulate the security services, manipulate the population, create uprisings – that that is Russia’s intention and they should – voters of Moldova therefore need to be aware of this and make their decisions accordingly.
So that’s the essence of what we did yesterday, and that seems a good place to stop and take some questions.
MODERATOR: All right. Thanks very much. So, we’ll now turn to the question-and-answer portion of the briefing.
All right. So, our first question is going to Momchil Indjov from Club Z Media in Bulgaria, and it says, “Do you have any information about how Russia is influencing the ethnic minorities in Moldova? What is the situation with the Bulgarians whose country of origin is an EU and NATO member-state?” And let me combine this with a question that we also have from Leonidio Ferreira, Diário de Notícias, Portugal, who asks more generally, “I would like to know if ethnicity plays a role in the Russian strategy in Moldova, Gagauz, Slavic people, Romanian-speaking Moldovans, specifically.” So, two similar questions there related to the ethnic minority issue in Moldova.
MR RUBIN: Well, yes. These are good questions and they’re right on point. Yes, Russia is intending to try to divide the people of Moldova by trying to manipulate the different ethnic regions. While the president of the country has worked very hard to ensure the rights of all the people of Moldova, the Russians are trying to use differences of ethnicity to try to divide. That’s one of the standard Russian playbooks. They’re doing it in both cases that were mentioned in the questions, and we are aware that ethnicity is one of the ways the Russians intend to use disinformation to exaggerate damage to individual ethnic groups that isn’t true or preferences against individual groups which isn’t true. These are standard Russian tropes that we hope the people of Moldova are smart enough to not take seriously and know that their government that has been operating now has pursued a policy that, in our opinion, has not sought to divide the people of Moldova but bring them together as they seek a future in the European Union. And so we hope that the use of these ethnic dividing lines that Russia is trying to exaggerate will have a minimal effect.
MODERATOR: Thank you, sir. Okay. Let’s go on to another question. We actually have a live question with a raised hand here from TV8 in Moldova. So, let’s go to them to have them ask you their question live here.
QUESTION: Hello? Can you hear me?
MR RUBIN: I can hear you.
QUESTION: Thank you very much. So regarding the joint statement exposing Russian subversive activity in electoral interference targeting Moldova, what evidence can you provide to be even more convincing? Because the pro-Russian parties in the Republic of Moldova are already saying that there is no evidence and that everything is very abstract. Thank you.
MR RUBIN: Right. Thank you for that question. Let me just say that I work at the Global Engagement Center; that I work very, very closely with the other agencies of the U.S. Government, the intelligence agencies included; that since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the United States has made decisions to downgrade information that was sensitive to make it available to the public, particularly in the case of the war in Ukraine when the Russians were denying they had amassed forces. They were intending to conduct a false flag operation and by downgrading intelligence the Biden administration worked to deflect that. We at the GEC have had a lot of success in using our work with the intelligence community to reveal Russian intelligence operations that are using disinformation. We’ve done that in Latin America. We’ve done that in Africa. We’ve disrupted those operations using information that has proven to be correct in every case. And so all I can tell you about the source of this information is that we work very, very hard with the Moldovan Government, with our friends and partners who made this statement, to use all the tools of government information gathering to make sure that when we make a statement like this it is not just like this, that it’s based on very real, hard credible information or we would not say it.
MODERATOR: All right. Thank you, sir. I’d like to go to a question from Elena, Moldova, PRO TV Chisinau. And the question is, “Could you name who are the persons who would organize these destabilizations?”
MR RUBIN: Right. Let me just say that we believe – and the statement itself makes clear – that Russia’s government is behind this effort. We all understand that Russia’s government has various pieces of the puzzle. There are many different parts of it: presidential administration, influence-for-hire firms that they use to implement steps, the FSB, the SVR, the GRU or intelligence services. Russia has many, many different avenues to pursue a policy once that policy decision is made. And we certainly have seen examples in the past where personnel from state-funded media outlets like RT have been involved in providing direct support to the fugitive Moldovan Ilan Shor for several years with the support of the Russian Government. So beyond saying that we believe this is a plan of the Russian Government to try to defeat the current president and try to overthrow her if they can’t defeat her in the polls, I can’t be more specific on individual names.
MODERATOR: Okay. Thank you, sir. So now we’re going to go to another live question, and this one is coming from Jeff Seldin from Voice of America.
QUESTION: Thank you so very much for doing this. The statement that was put out yesterday noted that Russia is currently supporting candidates for Moldova’s presidency. I’m wondering if you could talk more about how Russia is doing that and whether this is something that’s new for the – for this election or if this is something that Russia has been working on over time. And if so, how? Thank you.
MR RUBIN: Right. We have been following at the GEC very closely Russia’s effort to use disinformation in democracies. Elections are the times when individuals in democracies pay the most attention. So, if you’re in the disinformation business – and let’s face it, Russia has been in the disinformation business for centuries, and they treat it as a matter of the highest national priority. They devote billions of dollars to it. Disinformation at an election time is particularly aimed for a time when individual voters are focused on political issues, and that means funding parties, funding individuals, hiring outside groups to put out disinformation on specific channels. And let me just note here that unrelated to any action of the U.S. Government, the – Ilan Shor’s Facebook page was taken down in the last couple weeks because of conclusions that he was operating outside the terms of service of Facebook.
So, I guess to be as frank as I can, we’re talking about funding parties, we’re talking about funding outside groups, we’re talking about developing narratives to try to divide rather than – divide along ethnic lines. And when it comes to what might happen if the party that they – Russians don’t want to win doesn’t win, we’re talking about rent-a-crowds. We’re talking about individuals who will be gathered by the Russians in the hopes of mass protest that will be generated by Russia, not by internal forces of Moldova. So this is something we’ve seen in the past. The Russians attempt – and they have devoted, we believe, a particularly egregious, pernicious plan to act against Moldova, and that’s why Secretary Blinken shared the details of that with the Moldovan Government and why we as a government, along with Canada and the UK, revealed that yesterday.
I would say that we do believe the Moldovan Government is on the case. We are doing our part. We will continue to share information with the Moldovan Government in the months to come before this election happens. But again, it’s a typical Russian playbook of influence-for-hire firms, paid actors, using – as we’ve seen in the past – RT to provide direct support to fugitives like Ilan Shor. All of these are the Russian methods, and we expect them to use as many of them as they can in the hopes of – they’ve applied – the reason why we’re doing all this is we believe they’re applying a matter of high priority to interfere in the Moldovan election and, if necessary, to try to overthrow a democratically elected government.
MODERATOR: Thank you, sir. Let’s go on to an additional question, and this one come from – comes from Pauls Raudseps from the outlet Ir in Riga, Latvia. And the question is: “If Russia is planning to foment violence to overthrow the government, can the Moldovan security forces deal with such a threat? Do they need any help from other countries?”
MR RUBIN: Good question. I am not in the security sphere. In other words, I don’t work in the military aspect of things or in the security services. But I think the idea of informing a government of what is possibly going to happen several months from now if Russia doesn’t get its way – that they would foment a mass protest – is to ensure that the Moldovan authorities do have the capability to deal with it and to work with them to help them develop that capability so that – when you have an advanced warning of something several months in advance, you’re in a better position to do something about it than if it happens without your knowledge suddenly and you face this kind of interference without the opportunity to plan to deal with it.
So it’s a good question. I think it’s probably better answered by the Moldovans themselves, except to say that we are hoping by providing this information now, by revealing publicly this downgraded information, that Moldova will have as much time as possible to deal with that potential eventuality.
MODERATOR: Thank you, sir. We’re going to now go to another live question, and this one comes from Iulia Sarivan Jurnal TV in Moldova.
QUESTION: Hello?
MR RUBIN: Hello.
QUESTION: Mr. Rubin, previously there have been influences of Russian Federation in the Moldovan elections. Why do you think that now the three governments have decided to highlight this problem and to send this message? And my second question is: What are the concrete actions that Russia could take to compromise these elections, and besides disinformation?
MR RUBIN: Right. Why is a very simple answer. Two weeks ago or so, I accompanied Secretary Blinken to Chisinau. We met with President Sandu. And during that meeting, Secretary Blinken was able to provide some information to her that we had reasonably obtained of significance, and we discussed it. And both countries agreed it would be useful to make it public. Since that time, we’ve worked to make it public, and this is the way government works. You say you’re going to make something public a couple of weeks ago, and you work through a process through the downgrading process, and 10 days later it becomes a statement of the three governments who have a particular interest in this subject and care about making sure the people of Moldova have as much information as possible.
As far as the what and how, I’ve tried my best to answer that in previous questions by telling you that there is a pretty standard Russian playbook. It involves disinformation along issues that potentially divide populations – ethnicity being one of them – other relationships that will try to discredit the president herself through false disinformation. We would expect them to try that. We would expect them to plan, as I mentioned several times now, to see whether they can develop a rent-a-crowd to try to conduct a protest about the elections even before they’ve happened on the assumption that their candidates won’t win, the ones that they’ve supported financially.
So, I don’t know how much more specific I can be. That’s a pretty specific plan the Russians have that they’re using disinformation, covert influence, covert operations, mass crowds, overthrowing a government, financing pro-Russian actors. That’s a lot of detail for government work.
MODERATOR: Thank you, sir. I’d like to then pose one question of my own, and that would be to ask you about the significance of the fact that this is a joint statement of the United States – the UK, and Canada, making this statement together. So both specifically for this joint statement in relation to Moldova, but just more generally talking about multilateral or international efforts of combined forces who are pushing back and exposing this kind of disinformation, and what role that plays in this overall effort.
MR RUBIN: Thank you. I’ve been at the GEC basically a year and a half plus, and we felt – I felt, Secretary Blinken felt – that the subject of disinformation was not being taken seriously enough by governments around the world. And so Secretary Blinken launched an initiative with – in a meeting with the EU foreign ministers a few months after I arrived based on something called the framework to combat foreign information manipulation. That’s a list of activities that countries need to take if they’re going to take disinformation seriously, if they’re going to treat it as a national security threat that is taken seriously.
The last time the British and – the UK, Canada, and the United States issued a joint statement, it was precisely about that framework. I believe it was at the time of the Munich Security Conference. We issued a joint statement endorsing that framework. Since that time, Secretary Blinken or Under Secretary Allen, Assistant Secretary O’Brien, and others have signed MOUs with, I believe, now 18 countries that are committed to taking action in the five action areas of the framework.
That is creating a government policy about disinformation that is developing necessary capabilities to analyze information and to make laws that are appropriate for that. That is to work with civil society and the media, because let’s face it – if there’s one subject where government and independent media have a joint interest, it’s to live in a fact-based world. We want to live in that world; I believe journalists want to live in that world. And so it’s up to academics and journalists and civil society to do their part to make sure that they are the ultimate checkers for the people of all these countries.
And finally, the action areas of working together, so essentially what we’re doing here through this framework to counter foreign information manipulation is building a coalition of countries who believe that this is a national security challenge, just the way we built a coalition to counter ISIS, we’ve built coalitions on various subjects of national security importance over the years. This is the latest one that was launched by Secretary Blinken last summer, and we’re up to 18 countries as of a few days ago. I was in Prague and – sorry, I was in Poland, and I signed an MOU with the Polish Government. So that is the last time these three governments have issued a joint statement, was about the framework, and I guess what it means is that these three governments in particular work together to use their combined capabilities – some of which you can imagine that I normally – we don’t talk about, but lie in the field of intelligence information that they work together, and when they can provide advance warning, that is the best way to stop disinformation.
I will just offer to the audience my favorite example of the work that we’ve done is several months ago we were able to reveal a Russian disinformation operation in Africa before it got started. And what was particularly pernicious about this operation was they were going to try to scare Africans away from using Western medical care. So, they were – this was a case where disinformation would have killed people had they believed the lies about PEPFAR, the program to fight AIDS, about the work of the Gates Foundation and all of the Western medical facilities in Africa that have saved millions and millions of lives. The Russians were trying to lie about those facilities, claimed they were biological weapons testing and other crazy ideas, and had Africans not been warned, they might have avoided getting the medical treatment that could have saved their life.
So that’s why we do this, not only in a case of election interference in Moldova; we’ve done it vis-à-vis Russia in Africa and Latin America vis-à-vis the Ukraine war. So, the GEC is at the forefront of this effort, and we try our best to pick the right time and the right place to do what we can, and this was why we chose yesterday to work with our partners in the UK and Canada to put out that statement.
MODERATOR: Thank you, sir. Thank you very much. Okay. Unfortunately, that’s all the time we have for today. So I want to thank everyone for their questions. I want to thank you, Special Envoy Rubin, in particular for joining us. But before we end the call, I’d like to see if the special envoy has any final remarks or thoughts for the group.
MR RUBIN: No, just to say that I wish the people of Moldova the opportunity to have the freest, fairest possible election, with outside interference to a minimum, and let the voters vote and the voters decide.
MODERATOR: Great, an excellent ending thought. So, for our journalists on the line, we will send the audio recording of the briefing shortly to all the participating journalists, and we’ll provide a transcript as soon as it is available. And we’d also love to hear your feedback; you can contact us anytime at TheBrusselsHub@state.gov. Again, one word – TheBrusselsHub@state.gov. So, thanks again for your participation. We hope you can join us for another press briefing soon. And this ends today’s press briefing.
SPECIAL BRIEFING BRUSSELS HUB
JUNE 14, 2024 WASHINGTON DC
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SOURCES: https://www.state.gov/online-press-briefing-with-special-envoy-and-coordinator-of-the-global-engagement-center-james-p-rubin/ – Midtown Tribune news