MR. SULLIVAN: Good afternoon, everyone. I want to start by taking a moment to reflect on the last year and take stock of where we are. This is my seventh time visiting Israel as National Security Advisor. I was here on October 18th of last year when I joined President Biden to send a strong signal of support to the Israeli people following the horrific terrorist massacres by Hamas on October 7th.
President Biden believed at the time it was important to come to Israel shortly after those attacks, becoming the first American President to visit Israel in a time of war, because he wanted the people of Israel and also the people of the world to see that the United States would stand with Israel in its time of need.
A year after that trip, I was with the President in the Situation Room, where, for the second time in a period of five months, President Biden ordered the U.S. military to take direct action to defend Israel from a significant attack launched by Iran. Side by side, U.S. Naval destroyers joined Israeli air defense to intercept a rainfall of inbound missiles, ballistic missiles fired directly from Iran.
Over the past 15 months, we’ve remained vigilant to the further threats and attacks from Iran and its proxies, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis.
People seem to forget the basic fact of this conflict and these past 15 months: Israel did not seek or start this war. Hamas started this war, invading Israel in military formations, killing 1,200 people, kidnapping and holding hostage hundreds more — Israeli citizens and citizens from around the world.
Iran then made a fateful choice to join in and open a multifront war against Israel. Backed by the ironclad security partnership with the United States, Israel has defeated two direct attacks from Iran and directly struck into Iran in response, degrading Iran’s military capability.
Hezbollah’s leaders are gone, and we have concluded a ceasefire in Lebanon, the terms of which made clear that Hezbollah can never again rebuild its terror infrastructure to threaten Israel.
Hamas’s leaders are gone, including the masterminds of October 7th, and we will make sure that Hamas can never again threaten Israel as they did on October 7th, ever.
And now, the Assad regime in Syria is gone, removing the primary client state of Iran in the region and the lifeline to Hezbollah.
When Joe Biden said to those who seek to take advantage of October 7th and to use that tragic day to threaten and attack Israel, “Don’t,” this is what he meant, and we still mean it. Don’t.
The balance of power in the Middle East has changed significantly and not in the way that Sinwar or Nasrallah or Iran had planned.
We are now faced with a dramatically reshaped Middle East in which Israel is stronger, Iran is weaker, its proxies decimated, and a ceasefire that is new and will be lasting in Lebanon that ensures Israel’s security over the long term.
The purpose of my visit today has been to continue to build on this progress to ensure that that ceasefire sticks and is fully enforced; to capitalize on the opportunity of the fall of Assad for a better future for the people of Syria while vigilantly managing the risks that come with the change in Syria, including the possibility and the risk that terrorist groups like ISIS are able to take advantage and create new threats against the United States, Israel, and other countries in the region and around the world; to continue pressure on Iran while remaining vigilant against the continuing threat from Iran, including the threat from its nuclear program. And President Biden remains committed to the simple proposition that the United States of America will never permit Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon.
And to build on all that we’ve done, we’re now looking to close a hostage release deal and a ceasefire, which would stop the war and reunite hostages with their families.
Just over one year ago, we reached a deal that brought 78 hostages out of Gaza and home to their families. It’s time to finish the job and bring all of the hostages home.
Before departing Washington, I once again met with the families of the American hostages still held in Gaza. I made a commitment to them, the same commitment that I’ve made every time I’ve met with them: that I will do everything in my power to try to bring their loved ones home, to do my best to help them see their loved ones again. I had them in mind today when I met with Prime Minister Netanyahu, Minister Dermer, and the security team to try to bring us closer to a deal. And from here, I plan to travel to Doha and then on to Cairo to continue to advance this effort.
A ceasefire and hostage deal would start bringing those hostages home. It would also allow for a massive surge in humanitarian assistance. We discussed the humanitarian situation and the suffering of Palestinian civilians in Gaza today. We discussed recent steps taken to increase the flow of much-needed assistance and further steps that need to be taken in the days ahead.
It is an American commandment and a Jewish commandment that every innocent life has value. I have previously quoted a poem that means a great deal to my family, a poem from John Donne, which says, “Any man’s death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind.” That is the spirit that the United States has brought to this conflict — to stand up strongly in the defense of the State of Israel and try to reduce suffering of innocent people wherever they may be.
We are now in the midst of a political transition. I have been engaging my successor, the incoming National Security Advisor, in a professional and serious way on all of the issues that affect the State of Israel, the threats and the opportunities. And we’ve had good discussions, constructive and substantive discussions, and those will continue to ensure that there is a smooth handoff on January 20th.
There’s also something else important in those discussions, which is that it is my personal commitment to ensure that the U.S.-Israel partnership rests on a solid bipartisan foundation going forward. And I’m going to continue to do everything I can to contribute to that, because I believe it is in my country’s interest and the interest of the State of Israel.
So, thank you for bearing with me as I set the context for my visit today, report on some of the things we discussed and the current events, and I will be happy to take your questions.
Yeah.
Q Michelle Kelemen with NPR.
MR. SULLIVAN: Hi, Michelle.
Q Do you get the sense that Netanyahu is waiting for Trump to reach a hostage deal? And if so, do you think the hostages can survive until then?
MR. SULLIVAN: I believe that every day brings increasing risk, which is why there’s such urgency to try to get this deal. Obviously, we’ve seen the tragic death of hostages since the massacres of October 7th and over the course of the past 15-months conflict.
So as soon as we can close this deal, we should close this deal in the interest of bringing those hostages home.
The answer to your first question is: No, I do not get that sense. I got the sense today from the Prime Minister he’s ready to do a deal. And when I go to Doha and Cairo, my goal will be to put us in a position to be able to close this deal this month, not later.
Now, we’ve been close before and haven’t gotten there, so I can’t make any promises or predictions to you, but I wouldn’t be here today if I thought this thing was just waiting until after January 20th. I am here today because I believe every day matters, and we are going to use every day we have to try to close the deal as soon as we possibly can.
Yeah.
Q Thanks, Jake. Jake, what new concessions have Israel and Hamas made or indicated that they are prepared to make? We’ve seen, in particular, reports that Hamas is willing to allow Israeli troops to remain along Netzarim and Philadelphi for longer than previously. Can you confirm that Hamas has provided a list of hostages who they would release?
And then, just on Syria as well, if you could comment. The Israeli military has conducted nearly 500 strikes in recent days on Syrian military assets, not only chemical weapons depots but also missiles, helicopters, things that presumably a new Syrian army would need in the future to maintain stability inside of Syria. Are you at all concerned about the impact of those Israeli strikes? And did the Prime Minister provide you with any assurances about how long these strikes will continue for, if indeed they will?
MR. SULLIVAN: So, on your first question, I’m sorry to disappoint you, but I can’t negotiate in public on the terms of the hostage deal. I’ll leave the details where they belong, which is behind closed doors among the parties and the mediators. And as soon as we come to something that is an agreed document to bring forward, we will bring it forward and you can see all of its terms.
With respect to Syria, what Israel is doing is trying to identify potential threats, both conventional and weapons of mass destruction, that could threaten Israel and, frankly, threaten others as well, and neutralize those threats. That is part of its effort to protect the country in the midst of a very fluid situation.
We are in deep consultations with the Israeli government about where this goes from here, what that will look like in the days and weeks ahead. I’m going to leave it at that for now. But the efforts taken to date really have been focused on the types of capabilities that could represent a genuine threat to the State of Israel.
Yeah.
Q Hi. Thank you so much. Owen Alterman from i24NEWS. Two questions that are related.
First of all, we’ve seen reports in the last few days of American-backed Kurdish troops that have been shooting at and been shot by Turkish-backed troops in northeastern Syria. What are the red lines of Turkish involvement in that part of the country from the perspective of the administration?
And the second question: There’s concern in Israel that Turkish activity in Syria could ultimately, in the medium term even, be hostile to us and be hostile activities up to and including on our border. What kind of assurances can you give the Israeli public that that scenario won’t materialize?
MR. SULLIVAN: So, first, our commitment to our partnership with the Syrian Kurds, especially the Syrian Democratic Forces, is deep and resolute. And that commitment exists because we are in a partnership with them to fight ISIS. And they have been very capable counterterrorism partners not just in suppressing the threat from ISIS, but also in holding ISIS terrorists in large numbers in detention facilities in eastern Syria. And we want to make sure that that ongoing work is not disturbed.
Second, our own commitment to the continued defeat — work to defeat ISIS has just been renewed in a quite vigorous way over the weekend with a series of strikes on ISIS personnel and facilities in the central Syrian Desert, dozens and dozens of targets that we hit with real, intense American capability, B-52s. And what we are saying with that strike is we are going to continue to hit any ISIS threat where we find it, and we’re going to work with our partners to do so.
I have learned, maybe both the easy way and the hard way, not to speak about red lines in this part of the world publicly, so I do not intend to do so from this podium. But I do want to just make the point that we are engaged both in consultations with our Kurdish partners. In fact, General Kurilla was just recently very deeply in conversation with our Kurdish partners. And we are in conversations with Turkey as well about our expectations and about what we see as the best way forward.
I think those conversations are serious, they’re intense, they’re ongoing. They have already produced some results, including this de-escalation around Manbij that both Turkey and the Kurds have kind of informally signed up to. All of that is tenuous. It is fragile. It is something that is going to require ongoing work and cultivation, and it is something that we will be very vigilant to as a top priority going forward. But beyond that, I cannot comment further today.
Q What about assurances did Israel (inaudible) about Turkish activity in Syria (inaudible)?
MR. SULLIVAN: So, we look at the situation in Syria as having a range of different risks presented, including the potential for fracture in that state, as well as power vacuums that can give rise to terrorist groups that can threaten beyond borders, as well as the potential for groups to be in charge in Damascus who bear hostile intent to outside forces, including to neighbors like Israel.
All of those are possibilities. All of those are risks that President Biden has spoken to publicly and that we are dealing with partners on privately, including dealing with the Turks, who do have some measure of influence here, and where we have set out our views and expectations.
But again, given the nature of the situation, given the sensitivity, given the urgency, it’s important, I think, for us to be able to carry out those conversations behind closed doors as we make progress, and then we will share with you the results.
Yeah.
Q Jake, Raf Sanchez from NBC News. I know you’re not going to negotiate in public here, but there does seem to be more flexibility from both Israel and Hamas right now. What do you attribute that to? Is it the killing of Sinwar? Is it the weakening of Hezbollah? Is it President-elect Trump injecting urgency into this?
And just on Syria, the Israeli government is saying its presence in the buffer zone and outside of it, inside Syria itself, is temporary. Do you believe them that it’s temporary? Did the Prime Minister give you a sense of what conditions would need to be met before Israel would withdraw?
MR. SULLIVAN: We didn’t go into deep detail on the conditions, other than to say that those conditions would require Israel to feel that the kinds of understandings that were in place before the fall of the Assad regime to ensure stability, predictability, and security for Israel are put back into place.
And, yes, we do have every expectation that it will be temporary. The Prime Minister, the Israeli government have made that point not just to the United States, but have made that point publicly, and we take them at their word that that is the intention here as we work through a new arrangement that can ensure that Israel is secure in light of the risks that have been laid out in previous questions.
There are any number of reasons for why contexts change in negotiations, especially in a situation as fluid as this, but I would point out that Hamas’s posture at the negotiating table did adapt following the announcement of the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon. Why is that? It’s because, for months, we believe Hamas was waiting for lots of other actors and forces to come to their rescue, to come to their aid. And when we got that ceasefire, it was clear that the northern front had been decoupled from Gaza. And from that moment forward, we’ve had a different character to the negotiation, and we believe that it puts us in a position to be able to close this negotiation.
It is also, of course, relevant that Israel’s ability to meet so many of its military objectives in Gaza is relevant to the negotiation too, including the elimination of the top leader, Sinwar; other authors of that October 7th massacre; and the dismantlement, the destruction of the organized military formations of Hamas.
So these are relevant considerations that we think have put this onto a plane where it could get done. Whether it does get done still depends on both sides ultimately signing on the proverbial dotted line.
The last thing I will say with respect to the incoming administration is, actually, we’ve had, as I said in my opening comments, very good consultation and coordination with them, including on this issue, where we keep them apprised of how the negotiations are unfolding. We talk to them about how we can send a common message that the United States, no matter who’s sitting in the Oval Office, no matter whose party is in charge, wants to see this ceasefire and hostage deal and see it now. That is all part of the American contribution to an effort to ultimately produce an outcome here, and we’re going to keep working until we get it done.
Yeah.
Q Thank you, Mr. Sullivan. (Inaudible), Channel 14. Regarding the continuation of passage of humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip, knowing what we know now, that Hamas takes advantage of this aid and holds it as a leverage for its own rule, was it a mistake by your administration to push Israel to maintain the transport of humanitarian aid and, by that, to strengthen Hamas?
MR. SULLIVAN: It absolutely was not a mistake for the United States to seek to ensure that women and children and innocent people in Gaza, who have nothing to do with this fight but who, in fact, are being put in harm’s way by the way Hamas fights — using schools and mosques as terror infrastructure, hiding behind civilians, making it that much more difficult for Israel to carry the fight against Hamas and destroy its capabilities — those people deserve the basic sustenance of life. They deserve food, water, medicine, sanitation.
And, by the way, that’s not just an American position; that’s a requirement under international humanitarian law. And it is also the position of this Israeli government, who is not standing up saying we should give no humanitarian assistance to the people of Gaza. They’re saying something different.
Now, we have viewed various critical points over the course of the past 15 months as moments where not enough was getting in to ensure that people had what they needed to survive. And we made no bones about pressing on that. Because we think, at the end of the day, feeding starving children does not harm the security of the State of Israel, but it does vindicate our common shared values of humanity.
And so, as I said in my remarks, the American commandment, the Jewish commandment that every innocent life has value, that is a present factor and it’s something we have to take seriously, even as we take seriously that Israel has every right — indeed a duty — to go after its enemies with everything it’s got. You have done that, and we have backed you in going after your enemies, Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran itself. We have helped defend you against attacks, including from Iran itself. And we have also stood up to say: Let’s make sure that Israel is not responsible for the third famine of the 21st century.
We think that that is the right way to pursue a principled and just and strong, robust policy, and we will continue to do that as long as we’re in office.
Yeah.
Q (Inaudible) Jewish Insider. Do you have any update on the three Americans who are still believed to be alive?
MR. SULLIVAN: I only can tell you that we have received the tragic news about the passing of Gadi and Judi and Itay and Omer all on October 7th, and of course, the godawful killing of Hersh during the course of this conflict.
We believe the other three Americans are alive. We don’t have a proof of life from such a short time ago that I can tell you that for certain, but we believe that they are. And of course, we saw the video of Edan Alexander.
So we are operating on the proposition that there are seven Americans being held in Gaza currently — three of them alive, four of them deceased — and we want to bring all seven of them home.
Yeah.
Q Thank you. Itamar (inaudible) from (inaudible). I wanted to ask you if there is a linkage between the hostage deal and the ceasefire deal and the normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Is it realistic to bring about a deal, a normalization deal, before January 20?
MR. SULLIVAN: These are not linked. The ceasefire and hostage deal is something we are pursuing on its own, because it is, we believe, a humanitarian imperative to bring the hostages home, and it is in the strategic interests of the State of Israel because all of its interests, its core interests, are protected in that deal. We also believe it’s in the interest of the Palestinian people because it will allow for this surge in humanitarian assistance.
So we are pushing for that deal on its own terms, for its own purposes, because we want to follow through on our commitment to do everything possible to get the hostages home. So, there is no link there.
Of course, we continue to believe in a long-term vision for the region of normalization and integration, and the President has laid that out. And everything we do, we want to point in that direction. But I don’t have any updates for you today on the question of normalization.
Yeah.
Q Thank you. Gil Tamari, Channel 13 Israel. I would like to follow up on one of my colleague’s questions. The Prime Minister said today that Israel will continue to hold the territory in the buffer zone until there will be a governed force in Syria that will be able to oblige to the 1974 agreement. And as you may know, this might take years. So I would like to know if the United States is satisfied with the long-term Israeli position of — possession of the buffer zone.
And also, is the G7 statement relay also to Israel when talking about the territory of Syria?
And I know you cannot take us into the negotiation regarding the hostage, but can you give us the feeling? What makes you this time a little bit more optimistic? I know you hate to use the word “hopeful,” but what makes you this time a little bit more optimistic?
MR. SULLIVAN: So, first, on the question of Israel’s move into that border zone in Syria: This is a fluid situation. Fast-moving. I would submit that everyone in this room, both sitting in these chairs and behind the cameras, was not thinking about the fall of Assad one month ago. So that’s how fast things are moving.
What Israel saw was an immediate threat, the collapse of a structure that had been in place for a long time and the potential for that vacuum to be filled by a direct, proximate threat right across its border. So it moved in to fill that threat. That, from the United States’ perspective, is logical and consistent with Israel’s right to self-defense.
How this plays from here: We are a few days into this, so we will stay in close consultation with our Israeli partners, as well as with stakeholders in Syria, as well as with stakeholders across the region, and we will develop and elaborate a perspective on the best way forward in a coordinated way.
And I just can’t sit here today and begin projecting out years into the future, given that just days ago, Assad still sat in Damascus.
With respect to why there is more optimism in the air, shall we say, I think it’s partly for the reason that I laid out, which is: I do believe the ceasefire in Lebanon has generated a different context. I actually believe that the loss of Iran’s client state in Syria has contributed to that different context. Israel’s military progress against Hamas’s infrastructure formations and senior leaders has contributed to that context. So, the surround sound of these negotiations is different today than it has been in the past.
And then, the other point is that the people involved in these negotiations seem to me to have a little bit of a different feel about things than they did before. That’s less measurable but I think still present. And so —
Q (Inaudible) not negotiating directly with Hamas.
MR. SULLIVAN: No, I’m not referring to the Prime Minister. I’m not referring to the Prime Minister.
So those are the reasons why. But, look, we have been in a place before where American officials have stood before podiums and said we are close, and we were close but we didn’t get there. I believe we are close again. Will we get there? It is not yet clear whether we will or we won’t, but we are determined to try to drive this across the finish line.
I’ll take two more questions. Yeah.
Q So as we get ready — Maayan Hoffman from The Media Line. As we get ready to, potentially, as you said, optimistically sign some kind of ceasefire or hostage deal, that would be, presumably, with Hamas. And ultimately, the goal was to eradicate Hamas, to move them politically out of ruling Gaza. As we sign the ceasefire, is there any indication or vision for Hamas continuing, therefore, to rule Gaza in some perspective, or do you have a vision of somebody else taking over in the interim?
MR. SULLIVAN: So if you go back to President Biden’s speech in late May, laying out the terms of a phased ceasefire and hostage deal, the basic elements of and the basic framework of that deal are still live and part of the discussions that are happening today.
In that speech, he said that this is a roadmap to end the war, and it’s a roadmap to a future of Gaza without Hamas in power. Now, there’s a lot of steps between here and there, which is why a deal like this proceeds in phases. But that has been the stated position of the United States government going back several months.
Q But is there any progress (inaudible)?
MR. SULLIVAN: What I would just say is: The first thing that we need to do is get into the initial phase of the ceasefire and hostage deal; begin to produce the actual releases, the images of hostages being welcomed home to their families, as we saw a year ago with the 78 who were released. And then, the terms of the deal are built on the idea that there will be ongoing discussions, diplomacy, negotiations to move from phase one to phase two. So that’s an ongoing process that will continue.
Final question. Yeah.
Q Thank you. You have said before that you believe Prime Minister Netanyahu is willing to reach an agreement, and the defense minister has said yesterday it is possible; he told it to Secretary Austin. How close are we? And have you heard from Israeli officials that they will be willing to stop — to end the war if we will get all the hostages back? And can you honestly say that, after 14 months, Prime Minister Netanyahu has done everything in his power to bring the hostages back home, and it’s not Hamas have been always the obstacle?
MR. SULLIVAN: So I expected a question on kind of who’s responsible for this or for that, for the other thing.
I view my job and America’s duty as taking where we are today, which is close — I believe close — and bridging that final distance until we actually get into a deal.
Again, I want to reinforce that we can’t rest until it actually happens. It might not happen. But I believe it can happen with political will on both sides. The Israeli government has indicated, including the Prime Minister, they would like to see this done. We see movement from Hamas. We see commitment from the mediators. And I will go to Doha and Cairo to try to ensure the final impetus is there to bring this all together.
Beyond that, I’m not going to characterize the state of play, other than to say the reason that we are so determined to do this is, at one level, fundamentally human, which is to get people safely home to their families and to create calm for a period where suffering people in Gaza can get relief. But it goes at another level, deeply strategic. We think it is in the American strategic interest, as well as in the strategic interest of Israel, to do this deal. That’s true of the current administration. It is true of the incoming administration. It is true across the aisle in the United States. And that’s why we’re going to continue to work together to try to get this done.
Thank you all very much.
Tel Aviv, Israel December 12, 2024
Sources: White House WH.gov , Midtown Tribune